University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2003

Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with
Multiple Board Appointments
Stephen P. Ferris

University of Missouri-Columbia

Murali Jagannathan
SUNY Binghamton

Adam C. Pritchard

University of Michigan Law School, acplaw@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1555

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Pritchard, Adam C. "Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board
Appointments." S. P. Ferris and M. Jagannathan, co-authors. J. Finance 58, no. 3 (2003): 1087-111.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

THE JOURNALOF FINANCE * VOL.LVIII,NO.3 * JUNE 2003

Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by
Directors with Multiple Board Appointments
STEPHENP. FERRIS,MURALIJAGANNATHAN,and A.C.PRITCHARD*
ABSTRACT
Weexaminethe numberof external appointmentsheld by corporatedirectors.
Directors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to
attract directorships. Consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983),we find that
firmperformancehas a positive effect on the numberof appointmentsheld by
a director.Wefind no evidence that multiple directors shirk their responsibilities to serve on board committees.We do not find that multiple directors are
associated with a greaterlikelihood of securities fraudlitigation.Weconclude
that the evidence does not supportcalls for limits on directorshipsheld by an
individual.
INSTITUTIONALINVESTORSAND SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISTScriticize

firms for appointing

directors who hold directorships in multiple companies, contending that such directors are incapable of effectively monitoring the management of so many firms.
Informed observers such as ChancellorWilliam Allen (1992) of the Delaware Court
of Chancery argue that "effective monitoring requires a commitment of time and
resources ... The demands of the position, if properly understood, are inconsistent
in my opinion, with service on an impressively long list of boards (p. 457)"
Corporate governance activists echo these criticisms and propose specific limits to deal with the perceived problem. The Council of Institutional Investors
(1998) argues that in the absence of unusual and highly specific circumstances,
directors with full-time jobs should not serve on more than two other boards. The
National Association of Corporate Directors (1996) is more lenient, suggesting
that directors with full-time positions should not serve on more than three or
four other boards. The Business Roundtable (1997), by contrast, believes that limits on the number of directorships are ill advised.
Directors themselves disagree over the issue of multiple directorships. The
most commonly shared complaint among directors, according to Lipton and
*Ferris is from the College of Business, University of Missouri-Columbia, Jagannathan is
from the School of Management, Binghamton University-SUNY, and Pritchard is from the
Law School, University of Michigan. This paper has benefited from the helpful comments
and suggestions of Merritt Fox, Richard Lempert, Anil Makhija, Ronald Mann, Mark West,
seminar participants at the University of Michigan, University of Missouri-Columbia, Vanderbilt University, and the American Law and Economics Association and the Financial Management Association annual meetings. Pritchard acknowledges financial support from the
Cook Fund of the University of the Michigan Law School. The authors alone are responsible
for this work and any errors or omissions.
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Lorsch (1992), is insufficient time for the discharge of their professional responsibilities. A survey of directors of Fortune 500 companies by Korn/Ferry International (1998) finds that many directors believe too many board appointments
place an excessive burden on a director. Fifty-six percent of outside directors report that they declined an invitation to serve on an additional board, with the
majority citing a lack of time as their reason for refusal. These directors evidently
believe that too many board assignments might dissipate their time and attention, thereby undermining their ability to monitor management. That same
study also finds that an overwhelming majority of directors believe that
CEOs and other inside directors should be limited in the number of boards to
which they are appointed, but directors were evenly divided on whether limits
should be placed on outside directors. Thus, whether holding multiple directorships impairs an individual director's ability to monitor management has become a controversial topic that has spawned proposals for governance reform.
Despite this controversy, very little research has been done concerning the effect of multiple directorships on corporate performance. Our study tests the hypothesis that directors who serve on multiple boards become so busy that they
cannot monitor management adequately. What we call the Busyness Hypothesis
of corporate directorships postulates that serving on multiple boards overcommits an individual. As a consequence, such individuals shirk their responsibilities as directors. For example, overcommitted directors might serve less
frequently on important board committees such as the audit or the compensation
committees. If boards play an important role in firm performance, the implication of the Busyness Hypothesis is that the presence of multiple directors on a
firm's board reduces oversight of management and, as a result, the firm's market
value. Additionally, reduced monitoring by these busy directors might exacerbate other forms of agency costs, such as increased litigation exposure for the
firm.
Our principal findings are as follows. Examining the market for directors, we
find that the past performance of firms for which an individual serves as a director correlates with the number of directorships subsequently held by that individual, a result we call the reputation effect. When we test the Busyness Hypothesis
in a multivariate framework, we find no evidence that multiple board appointments harm subsequent firm performance.
Additional tests confirm this result. An event study of firms announcing the
appointment of a multiple director finds that firms announcing the appointment
of a multiple director for the first time experience significantly positive abnormal
returns. Comparing committee service by multiple directors with that of nonmultiple directors, we find that multiple directors serve on more committees
and attend more committee meetings. Such a result is inconsistent with shirking
by multiple directors. Finally, we find no relation between the number of directorships and the likelihood of securities fraud litigation against the firm. Overall,
we conclude that our findings do not support the Busyness Hypothesis.
We organize this study into six sections. In Section I, we discuss the prior literature relating to the market for directors and multiple directorships. In Section II, we discuss our data and methods, and we describe the characteristics of
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multiple directors in Section III. In Section IV, we examine the relation between
the firm'sprevious performance and the number of directorships held by its directors as well as the likelihood that a director will add an additional board appointment. Section V presents the results of our tests of the Busyness Hypothesis.
Section VI concludes with a brief summary.

I. The Market for Directorships and the Influence of Directors on Firm
Performance
Some scholars argue that the market for directors serves shareholder interests. Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that multiple board appointments can signal director quality. The appointment to numerous boards might be the result of
the superior performance enjoyed earlier by the firm for which the individual
serves as a director or as an executive. If the market for directors is linked to
corporate performance, firm success can generate additional offers of board employment. Following Fama and Jensen, Gilson (1990), Kaplan and Reishus (1990),
and Vafeas (1999) suggest that the number of directorships held by a director
might proxy for reputational capital, with such individuals viewed as high quality directors. Moreover, service on multiple boards can provide a director with a
greater diversity of experience.
Related research shows that poor performance is punished in the market for
directors. Gilson (1990) finds that outside directors who leave the boards of financially distressed firms hold approximately one-third fewer directorships three
years after their departure. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) find that top executives
of firms that reduce dividends are 50 percent less likely to obtain additional directorships. Similarly, Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999) report that the number of
board seats held by retiring CEOs is related to firm performance prior to their
retirement. Shivdasani (1993) observes that outside directors of firms that are
the targets of hostile bids are likely to hold fewer directorships than directors
of nontarget firms. If firms become targets due to poor performance, Shivdasani's
findings lend additional support to Fama and Jensen's (1983) argument. In sum,
these studies suggest that directors of underperforming firms suffer from tarnished reputations in the market for directors.
Other factors might influence the number of directorships held by an individual. Booth and Deli (1995) argue that larger firms have wider contracting environments, requiring negotiations with more parties. The increased level of
business transactions resulting from these contracts can create a greater opportunity for offers of additional board memberships. Multiple directorships permit
the firm to use its directors to form or solidify advantageous contracting relations
with other firms, such as important suppliers or customers. An alternative argument for a relation between firm size and the number of directorships held per
director is that directors of large firms might be attractive as candidates for
other boards because of the networking contacts they represent to these firms.
In addition, directors of large firms might be perceived as more skilled because
of the size and complexity of the operations they oversee.
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Certain scholars are more skeptical that the market for directors serves shareholder interests. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) suggest that directors can become overcommitted when serving on
multiple boards, rendering them unable to provide meaningful managerial monitoring. Managers subject to lax monitoring might be able to impose greater
agency costs on the firm, with a consequent reduction in firm performance and
value. The empirical work of these scholars offers some support to the Busyness
Hypothesis.
Core et al. (1999) report that the presence of directors holding multiple appointments correlates with excess CEO compensation, implying that such directors serve as an inadequate check on management. Shivdasani and Yermack
(1999) also provide evidence that questions the independence of directors who
hold multiple appointments. They report that directors with multiple directorships are more likely to be chosen for an additional board seat if the CEO of the
firm is involved in the director selection process. This evidence suggests that directors holding multiple appointments cater to CEOs, implying that their monitoring of management does little to reduce agency costs. If this is correct, the
market for directors might be geared toward ensuring a compliant board for the
CEO, rather than representing shareholder interests.
Other evidence, however, suggests that multiple directors are associated
with firm success. Miwa and Ramseyer (2000) find that the presence of directors
holding multiple directorships was strongly related to firm performance in
the cotton spinning industry in Japan during the first decade of the 20th
century. Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) document that shareholders receive larger premiums in tender offers when the board includes multiple directors. Finally, Brown and Maloney (1999) find that firms enjoy superior returns
from acquisitions when they have directors who hold multiple directorships.
These studies suggest that multiple directorships are consistent with
shareholder interests. Whether the results of these studies can be generalized, however, is open to question, given their specialized settings and circumstances.

II. Data and Methods
A. Sample Construction
The primary sample that we examine in this study consists of those firms on
COMPUSTAT with at least $100 million in total assets at the beginning of 1995.
We are able to obtain proxy statements for 2,002 of these firms, from which we
obtain directors' names, age, individual director's equity ownership, board ownership, board tenure, professional affiliation, and independence. We obtain directors' names, age, and the boards ownership for an additional 1,188 firms from
Compact Disclosure. This produces a final sample of 3,190 firms. The various measures of directorships held by individual directors used in this study only include
appointments to the boards of our sample firms. This constraint is necessary to
allow us to examine firm-level accounting and financial data, which we obtain
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from COMPUSTAT.The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database
provides equity return time-series data.
B. Measurement of Multiple Directorships
For each firm, we calculate several different measures of multiple directorships. Each measure is calculated at the level of the firm'sboard, thereby allowing
us to match firm-level data with these measures of multiple directorships. The
first, directorships per director, measures, for a given firm, the average number
of sample firm directorships held by the directors of that firm. The second measure is the maximum number of directorships held by any one member of a firm's
board. Our third measure is the percentage of directors on a board who hold
three or more directorships.
We calculate two additional measures of multiple directorships to provide a
more particularized assessment of the effect of director business on the firm. To
focus on external monitoring, our fourth measure is the average number of directorships held by the outside directors1 of a given firm. Because the potential distraction of multiple directorships might be more of a problem for firms that
employ these potentially overstretched individuals as officers, our final measure
is the maximum number of directorships held by any executive of the firm (in
practice, usually the CEO).2We include board chairs as executives in calculating
this measure because many chairmen who do not hold titles as officers nonetheless receive salaries, suggesting that they are full-time employees of the firm.

III. Characteristics

of Directors Holding Multiple Appointments

A. The Incidence of Multiple Directorships
In Panel A of Table I, we report data regarding the frequency of multiple board
directorships for our sample in 1995.3 We immediately observe that multiple directorships are not the norm. Only 16 percent of all directors hold two or more
board seats. Even less common, at approximately 6 percent of the sample of total
limit prodirectorships, are directors holding three or more directorships-the
posed by the Council of Institutional Investors. For those directors (hereafter
"multiple directors"), the directorships they hold are heavily skewed toward the
largest firms in our sample. We find that multiple directors hold approximately
half of their directorships in Forbes 500 firms.We conclude that multiple directorships are primarily a large-firm phenomenon.
1Weinclude in this category all directors who are not currently employed by the firm.
In calculating variables related to executives, we take data related to the executive with
the highest number of directorships. In the event of a tie between two or more executives, we
focus on the highest ranking, that is, chair over CEO, CEO over CFO, and so forth. Because
the CEO is most commonly the individual with the greatest number of directorships, we refer
to the variables related to this executive as "CEO"for ease of exposition.
3
These statistics are calculated at the level of the individual director, rather than the board
level.
2
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Table I

Patterns in the Number of Directorships

Held by Directors

Panel A presents the numbers of directors for our sample firms, classified by the number of directorships held. The sample consists of those firms on Compustat with at least $100 million in
total assets at the beginning of 1995for which we have director data from either corporate proxy
statements or CompactDisclosure.We calculate the number of directorships held for any individual director using only directorships held in this sample of firms. Panel B contains the mean
(median) for various measures of directorships held. Directorships per director is estimated as
the total number of directorships held by the directors of a board divided by board size. The
maximum number of directorships held is the largest number of total directorships held by
any director on a specific board. The percentage of directors holding three or more directorships is the number of directors holding three or more total appointments divided by board size.
Directorship per outside director is the mean number of directorships held by the outside directors of the firm.This variable assumes a value of zero if the firm does not have any outside directors on its board. The maximum number of directorships held by an executive is the largest
number of total directorships held by a director on the board who is also an executive of the firm
(including the chairman of the board).
Panel A: Directors by Number of Directorships
Directorships
Held
1
2
3
4

Number of
Directors

Fraction of
Directors

Fraction of
Total Directorships

19,978
2,383
767
351

84.39
10.07
3.24
1.48

67.60
16.13
7.79
4.75

115

0.49

1.95

47
17
10
3
0
2
23,673
29,554
3,190

0.20
0.07
0.04
0.01
0.00
0.01

0.95
0.40
0.27
0.09
0.00
0.07

5

6
7
8
9
10
11
Total directors
Total directorships
Number of firms

Fraction of
Directorships in
Forbes500 firms
18.51
33.74
46.59
50.71
59.48

49.65
59.66
68.75
37.04
0.00
63.64
5,979
7,721
653

Panel B: Means (Medians) for Alternative Measures of Multiple Directorships
Directorships
per Director
1.600
(1.40)

Maximum Number
Directorships Maximum Number
Percentage of
of Directorships
of Directorships Directors with Three per Outside
Held by an Executive
Director
or More Directorships
Held
3.12
(3)

14.97
(9.09)

1.89
(1.70)

1.91
(1)

In Panel B, we present alternative measures of multiple directorships. The
mean (median) of directorships per director is 1.60 (1.40), the maximum number
of directorships held by any director of a firm has a mean (median) of 3.12 (3.00),

while the percentage of directors holding three or more directorships has a mean
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(median) of 14.97 percent (9.09 percent).4 When we focus on the outside directors
and the executives who serve on the board, we find that the means are quite similar for the two categories (1.89 directorships per outside director, 1.91for the maximum number of directorships held by an executive), although the median is
higher for the outside directors measure (1.70and 1, respectively).
B. Professional Affiliations of Directors
We examine the professional affiliations of directors in Table II. We collect this
demographic data from corporate proxy statements. Not surprisingly, current
and former corporate executives are the largest source of directors, accounting
for over 56 percent of the directors with one or two directorships and 62 percent
of the multiple directors. Executives from large Forbes 500 firms are much more
likely to be multiple directors than their counterparts from smaller firms, suggesting that the experience of running a major company leads to more offers of
directorships than experience running smaller firms. Among other groups, venture capitalists stand out as frequent multiple directors, perhaps reflecting ownership interests or perceived expertise in firm monitoring.
C. Director and Firm Characteristics
In Table III, we continue our univariate analysis of the characteristics of multiple board memberships. We compare firms with multiple directors with firms
whose directors hold only one or two directorships.
The firm characteristics that we compare include several sets of possible determinants of the number of board appointments. The first set focuses on the demands imposed by directorships: Whether directorships are held in a single
industry5 and whether directorships are held in large firms which we proxy by
inclusion on the Forbes 500 list. The second set includes important financial characteristics: firm size (total assets), the firm's growth potential (market-to-book
ratio), and profitability (operating margin). The final set includes director and
board characteristics: average age of the directors, equity ownership by the entire board, equity ownership by the outside directors, board size, and the percentage of outside directors.
C.1.Financial Characteristics
We find that multiple directorships are associated with larger firms as measured by total assets at the beginning of 1995. This result is consistent with the
view that larger firms have more external contracting relationships than smaller
companies and hence greater opportunity for gain from the well-bonded relationships likely to result from external directorships. It is also consistent, however,
4Although not reported separately, we find that the correlation between these three measures is high (ranging from 0.79 to 0.93). Given such a high correlation, our alternative measures of multiple directorships unsurprisingly produce similar results. Accordingly, we
tabulate only the directorships per director measure for our multivariate regressions.
5For individuals holding three or more directorships, industry directors are defined as
holding at least 50 percent of their directorships within the same two-digit SIC code.
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Table II

Professional

Affiliation of Sample Directors by Directorships

A director is considered to be a multiple director if he/she holds three or more directorships in the samp
information about director affiliation is restricted to those firms for which 1995 corporate proxy statements
ment banker directors includes individuals identified on the proxy statements as commercial and investme
sors, insurance company directors, and other financial directors. Consultant directors consist of consultant
capitalist and Forbes500 executive directors are limited to individuals so identified on the proxy statement
executives of non-Forbes500 sample firms and former executives. The other directors classification consists
government officials, educators, military officers, executives of nonprofit organizations, relatives, and ind
Directors of firms for which these proxies are unavailable are classified as unknown. Statistical significan
indicated by ** and ***, respectively.

Directors with One or Two Directorships
Primary Professional Affiliation
Commercialand investment bankers
Venture capitalists
Consultants
Forbes500 executives
Other executives
Other
Unknown
Total

Number of Directors

Row Percent

1497
185
1922
1335
6166
2090
9166
22,361

89.16
84.86
94.41
81.70
92.31
92.93
99.87
94.46
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Number of Directors R
182
33
114
299
513
159
12
1312
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Table III

Comparative

Characteristics

of Firms with and without Multiple
Directors

TableIII compares the means (medians) of firm and board characteristics of firms between firms
with and without multiple directors. A director is considered a multiple director if he/she holds
three or more directorships in the sample firms. All financial variables are calculated as of fiscal year-end 1994. Industry directors are defined as individuals holding three or more directorships with at least 50 percent of their directorships held in firms having the same two-digit SIC
code. Directorships per director in Forbes500 firms is the mean number of directorships held by
a director in Forbes500 firms.The market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of firm
equity plus the book value of preferred stock plus the book value of debt to the total value of
assets. Operating margin is annual operating income standardized by total assets. Total assets
are those reported by Compustat at year-end. Corporate governance data is obtained from the
firms'proxies for the 1995 proxy season. Board size is firm'stotal number of directors, while
board ownership is the percent of the firm'stotal outstanding equity held by the firm'sdirectors.
Outside director ownership is percent of total equity held by outside directors. Thirty firms with
boards of three or less are not included in this analysis due to incomplete information. Statistical significance at the one percent level is indicated by ***

Characteristic
Number of firms
Number of firms with industry directors
Directorships per director in Forbes500 firms
Total assets
Market-to-book
Operating margin
Average Age
Board Ownership
Outside Directors Ownership
Board Size
Percent Outside Directors

Firms without
a Multiple
Director
1449
0.82
(0)
832.12
(306.39)
1.87
(1.47)
9.61
(5.13)
57.01
(57.28)
23.59
(16.29)
5.84
(1.08)
8.51
(8)
17.61
(16.67)

Firms with
a Multiple
Director

t-statistic
(Wilcoxon z)

1711
291
0.80
(0.44)
5214.89
(793.12)
2.43
(2.02)
14.56
(13.87)
58.07
(58.59)
17.86
(7.40)
5.42
(0.64)
10.37
(10)
32.84
(33.33)

34.44**
(38.1)***
10.23***
(18.61)***
9.91***
(12.99)***
12.12***
(14.66)***
5.79***
(5.74)***
7.03**
(11.41)***
0.60
3.42***
14.95***
(15.94)***
17.62**
(15.48)***

with the view that directors and executives of large firms are perceived to possess
desirable abilities resulting from their oversight of a major corporation.
To analyze firm value, we employ both market and accounting-based measures.
We use the firm's market-to-book ratio and the firm's operating profit margin. We
explicitly include an accounting based measure of performance because managers are often provided incentives to respond to accounting figures rather than
more conventional market benchmarks (Bhagat, Brickley, and Lease (1985), Gaver, Gaver, and Battistel (1992), and Kumar and Sopariwala (1992)).

This content downloaded from 141.211.57.224 on Mon, 04 May 2015 15:01:27 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1096

The Journal of Finance

The differences between firms on these measures are generally statistically significant. Most notably, firms with multiple directors are more highly valued as
measured by the market-to-book ratio. Firms with multiple directors also enjoy
higher operating profit margins.6
Overall, we believe that these comparisons are consistent with the contention
of Fama and Jensen (1983) that multiple directorships relate positively to firm
performance. These simple comparisons do not, however, indicate the direction
of causation between firm performance and a board appointment. If the market
for directors works efficiently, the best directors should receive the greatest number of offers to serve as a director. These quality directors might generate higher
levels of performance from the firm. Alternatively, Bhagat and Black (1999) argue
that more successful firms are able to attract directors who serve on multiple
boards. We explore the nature of this relation between multiple directorships
and firm performance in greater detail in Sections IVand V.
C.2. CorporateGovernance Characteristics and Agency Costs
Given the fees and prerogatives associated with board membership, an agency
cost view of multiple board affiliations hypothesizes them as a form of perquisite
consumption. The Busyness Hypothesis implies that multiple board memberships might reflect organizational slack due to agency conflict: Directors overcommit themselves at the expense of shareholders because they enjoy the
prestige and fees associated with sitting on numerous boards. Reduced monitoring by such directors allows managers to impose greater agency costs on shareholders.
Directors who are older might pose a last-period risk. Individuals close to retirement age might seek to maximize their current incomes by accepting excessive commitments. Alternatively, individuals nearing retirement age might view
multiple directorships as an interesting and lucrative part-time job for their retirement years. Either motivation could lead to poor performance in their current
employment. That poor performance is unlikely to be sanctioned by job termination or reductions in salary because of the proximity to retirement. Brickley et al.
(1999), however, find that the number of board seats held by retiring CEOs is related to firm performance prior to their retirement. We find that directors are, on
average, older for firms with multiple directors, suggesting that the final period
problem might be an issue. The magnitude of the difference, however, while statistically significant, is only one year.
Equity ownership by the board and executives might align their interests more
closely with those of shareholders. For example, Bhagat, Carey, and Elson (1999)
find that outside directors holding greater equity are more likely to replace the
6We obtain similar results (untabulated) when we compare firms that have executives who
are multiple directors with firms lacking an executive who serves on multiple boards. For
firms with executives who are multiple directors, however, the mean profitability is lower,
but median profitability is statistically indistinguishable from that for firms without such executives. We also obtain evidence suggesting that firms with multiple directors enjoy higher
market-to-book ratios.
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CEO of a poorly performing company. If directors accept appointments to additional boards as a form of perquisite consumption, then we should observe lower
equity ownership by directors for firms with multiple directors. Equity holding
directors should be reluctant to accept excessive directorships since impaired
monitoring would impose direct costs in the form of lower prices for their equity.
We find that firms with multiple directors have lower overall board ownership,
as well as lower ownership by outside directors. These findings are consistent
with the argument that directors view additional board memberships as perquisites and are deterred from accepting additional directorships when they face
greater personal costs from such consumption. They are also consistent, however,
with the view that different directors might bring different skills to the directorship role. Some directors can be good monitors because they have invested their
own capital in the enterprise, while others are effective monitors because of their
experience.7 While these differences might reflect agency costs, they might also
be a statistical artifact: Multiple directors serve on the boards of larger firms, so
personal wealth constraints might preclude their ability to gain substantial ownership in those firms (especially considering their service on the boards of multiple firms).
Lack of monitoring might also be reflected in board size. Yermack (1996) and
Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1997) argue that large boards are often unwieldy, while smaller boards can monitor managers more effectively. Table III documents larger board size for firms with multiple directors. This finding supports
the view that multiple directorships can be a form of perquisite consumption, a
result consistent with the Busyness Hypothesis. Alternatively, firms with larger
boards present greater opportunities for board members to make connections
leading to additional invitations to serve on other boards. If this view is correct,
directors serving on larger boards are more likely to hold more directorships. As
with board ownership, however, our findings might simply reflect the fact that
holding multiple directorships is a large firm phenomenon.
Finally, less independent boards might reflect agency costs. Boards with a
greater percentage of outside directors might be able to exercise greater monitoring and demand more accountability from managers. The relation of independence to performance is not clear. Bhagat and Black (2001) find no correlation
between board independence and firm performance.
In sum, our univariate comparisons suggest that multiple directorships are
generally consistent with our conjectures regarding firm size and profitability.
But several features of corporate governance for firms with multiple directors
suggest the presence of agency costs. Such an interpretation is consistent with
the arguments of the Council of Institutional Investors and other corporate governance activists. These characteristics, however, also relate to firm size and multiple directorships are a large firm phenomenon. We explore this tension in
greater detail in the next sections with a multivariate analysis.

7We also find (in untabulated results) that executives who are multiple directors hold a
smaller percentage of equity in their firms than executives who are not multiple directors.
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IV. The Effect of Firm Performance

on the Number of Directorships

The univariate comparisons for the operating margin and the market-to-book
ratio discussed in the previous section suggest that there might be a positive relation between multiple directorships and firm performance. To test whether firm
performance influences the number of directorships as posited by Fama and Jensen (1983), we estimate a series of multivariate logistic regressions. These regressions use director data, thus allowing us to examine the determinants of a
directorship at the level of individual director. We first examine the influence of
firm performance on the number of directorships held by the set of all directors in
our sample. We then separately examine the effect of firm performance on the
number of directorships held by executives.
We include a number of control variables that might affect the individual's desire to serve on more boards and influence the individual's attractiveness as a
director. Previous firm performance is estimated as the average of the mean operating margin over the period 1993 through 1995 for all firms with which the
director was affiliated. For the analysis of executives who are directors, we use
the mean operating margin over the period 1993 through 1995 for the firm that is
their full-time employer because this is likely to be the most salient indicator of
their business acumen. Average ownership in the firms reflects the personal cost
to the director of having his attentions diluted with the addition of more boards.
For executives, we use their ownership in the firm that is their full-time employer.
Age is a proxy for the director's experience as well as the energy that an individual might have for the demands of board service. Surveys report that lack of
time is the reason most often cited for declining offers of board seats. Average
firm size is a proxy for the intensity of monitoring required of the director.
Although larger firms are likely to demand additional effort, they might also
send a more positive signal of a director's skill as a monitor. For our regressions
examining the acquisition of additional board appointments, we include the number of boards the director sat on in 1994 as a proxy for existing demands on the
individual's time.
We present our findings in Table IV. Panel A contains our findings for the determinants of the total number of directorships held by an individual director8
while in Panel B we examine what factors determine whether an individual gains
an additional board appointment. We find evidence consistent with a reputational effect in the market for directors. Prior firm performance has a positive
coefficient and is strongly significant as a determinant of the number of directorships held in both sets of regressions; it is also strongly statistically significant
for directors receiving new appointments. Overall, these results imply that the
firm's previous performance influences the number of seats that a director holds
as well as the likelihood of an appointment to a new board. In aggregate, these
results indicate that the market for directorships rewards good monitoring insofar as that monitoring can be associated with strong financial performance.
8All directors holding more than five directorships are coded as holding six for purposes of
this regression.
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TableIV

The Effect of Firm Performance

on the Number of Directorships

Panel A reports the results of an ordered logistic regression examining the determinants of the
number of directorships held by the sample of all directors and separately for executives who
are directors. If the number of directorships exceeds five, then the number of directorships is set
to six. Panel B reports the results of a binomial regression in which the dependent variable is
whether the individual received an additional directorship between 1994 and 1995.Total assets
are those reported by Compustat at year-end. Operating margin is the firm'soperating income
standardized by total assets. Ownership is equity ownership of the board of directors. For directors these variables are the mean for all firms upon whose boards they sit. CEOis defined as the
executive with the greatest number of directorships (usually the CEO). Operating margin for
CEO firms is for the firm that is the CEO'sfull-time employer.CEO ownership is the percent of
total equity held by the director with the greatest number of directorships, usually the CEO.
Age is the chronological age of the individual. Current directorships is the number of directorships held by the individual as of 1994. Statistical significance at the 10,5, and 1 percent levels is
indicated by * **, and ***, respectively.

Variable

All Directors

Executives

Panel A: Determinants of Directorships
Intercept 1
Intercept 2
Intercept 3
Intercept 4
Intercept 5

-4.810***
- 6.046***
- 7.001***
- 8.077***
- 8.983***

Log of average total assets95

-5.461***
- 6.741***
- 7.701***
- 8.818***
- 9.960***

0.423 **

Log of total assets for CEO firm95

- 0.006**

Average operating margin93_95
Operating margin for CEO firm93-95

1.417* * *

Average director ownership
CEO ownership
Age

0

0.136***
0.369***
0.049***

0.008***

Panel B: Determinants of Additional Directorships
- 18.599

Intercept

1.553***

Log of average total assets95

0.195**

0.201 **

2.967***

2.041*

Log of total assets for CEO firm95
Average operating margin93_95
Operating margin for CEO firm93-95
Average director ownership
CEO ownership
Current directorships
Age

0.003
-1.009***
- 0.048***

-0.036
16.284
- 0.030*

We find that age has a significant positive coefficient in the regression for the
number of directorships held. Age is significant and negative, however, in Panel
B's regression for additional directorships, suggesting that older directors (who
already hold a greater number of directorships) are either less interested in
additional directorships or less attractive candidates. The number of directorships also has a statistically significant negative coefficient in the directors' regression for the appointment to new boards, suggesting that firms are reluctant
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to appoint directors who might overextend themselves (or directors are reluctant
to accept an additional appointment that can overextend them). Firm size is consistently positive and statistically significant, reinforcing our earlier finding that
multiple directorships are a large-firm phenomenon.
In sum, our results suggest that the previous performance of firms follows directors and affects both the number of directorships they currently hold and their
ability to attract additional board appointments. We interpret such a result as
consistent with the presence of a reputational effect in the market for directors,
as posited by Fama and Jensen (1983). Such an effect should serve as a further
incentive for directors to provide satisfactory monitoring.
V. Empirical Tests of the Busyness Hypothesis
The multivariate analysis of Section IV reports a relation between firm performance and the number of directorships an individual subsequently holds. The Busyness Hypothesis, however, predicts that multiple directorships will lead to
poorer firm performance in the future because they dilute the quality of managerial monitoring.
In this section, we test the Busyness Hypothesis through a series of empirical
tests. We first examine the relation between multiple directorships and subsequent firm performance in a multivariate framework. We also perform an event
study of the response to the appointment of a multiple director to a firm'sboard.
We then examine whether multiple directors do, in fact, provide a level of monitoring comparable to that of directors holding only one or two board appointments by investigating their level of committee service. Finally, we evaluate the
effectiveness of the monitoring provided by multiple directors by using as a measure of director effectiveness the incidence of securities fraud litigation against
the firm over a three-year sample period. We estimate a logistic regression to determine whether firms with multiple directors are sued more often than firms
without multiple directors.
A. A Multivariate Analysis of Multiple Directorships and Firm Performance
Several findings from Table III suggest that the presence of multiple directorships might generate higher agency costs: Boards with multiple directors (as well
as executives who are multiple directors) hold less equity, are larger in size, and
the directors' average age is slightly older. If these agency costs are significant,
then reduced monitoring by multiple directors should be reflected in an inverse
relation between measures of multiple directorships and subsequent firm performance.
To test this prediction of the Busyness Hypothesis, we regress firm performance in 1997 against a set of independent variables calculated as of 1995.To control for the intensity of monitoring required by a director, we include the number
of external directorships held by the firm's directors in Forbes 500 companies. The
demands of serving on the board of a Forbes 500 company might be more distracting than service on the board of a smaller firm. The firm'stotal assets capture firm
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size, which simultaneously influences a firm'srisk and its observed pattern of returns. To control for the possibility that a firm'sprior success can affect its ability
to attract prominent directors, we include the ratio of the firm'soperating income
to assets in 1995. Directors who specialize in a given industry might be less distracted by the demands of multiple directorships, so we also include an indicator
variable for firms with an industry director. Equity ownership by the board and
outside directors partially reflects the cost to individual directors of poor managerial oversight. Likewise, equity ownership by the CEO reflects the personal
cost to him or her of the distraction of multiple directorships. Board size and
percentage of independent directors have previously been found to affect board
oversight.
Table V presents the results of our test of the Busyness Hypothesis. We obtain
positive coefficients for both the number of directorships per director as well as
the number of directorships held by outside directors. This finding, while not statistically significant, is inconsistent with the Busyness Hypothesis, which contends that the presence of multiple directors harms the firm because of their
inability to provide adequate monitoring of managerial decision making. The positive coefficient for the indicator variable for executives holding multiple directorships suggests that firms are not harmed by executives with substantial
external commitments.9
As a robustness test of this result, we also regress annual changes in our measures of multiple directorships against changes in the firm's operating return on
assets over the two years following the change in the directorships measure. We
include board size, firm size, and board ownership as control variables in these
regressions. We fail to find any significant relation between our measures of multiple directors and long-term profitability in these regressions, so we do not separately report them.
B. Event Study of the Effect of an Appointment of a Multiple Director
In this part, we perform an event study of the announcement of the appointment of a multiple director to a firm's board. We construct our sample by using
the 1995 proxy statements to identify the year that a specific multiple director is
appointed to a board. We then search the Dow Jones Newswire to identify public
announcements of the appointment of those multiple directors. We then confirm
their status as multiple directors at the time of their appointment to the given
firm's board using director data from Compact Disclosure. This procedure yields
291 observations of public announcements of the appointment of a multiple director from 1990 to 1995.
Table VI reports the results from an event study of the announcement of the
appointment of individuals holding multiple directorships to firms' boards. The
9We also perform these regressions using: (1) only the unregulated firms in our sample, (2)
an indicator variable for regulated firms, and (3) mean return on assets over the period 1993
to 1995 as a performance measure. We obtain qualitatively identical results for these sets of
regressions. In addition, we simultaneously estimate firm performance and directorships
from 1995 data using two-stage least squares regression. We obtain similar results.
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TableV

Multiple Directorships

and Firm Performance

TableV presents the results of our regressions between directorships and firm value. The market-to-book ratio is measured as of 1997. Directorships per director is estimated as the total
number of directorships held across all the directors of a board divided by board size. Directorship per outside director is the mean number of directorships held by the firm'soutside directors. This number is set to zero if the firm does not have any nonexecutives on its board.
Directorships per director in Forbes 500 firms is the mean number of directorships in Forbes
500 firms. CEO is defined as the executive (including the chair) with the greatest number of
directorships (usually the CEO).A firm has a CEO as a multiple director if any executive holds
three or more directorships. Directorships held by highest ranking executive in Forbes500 firms
is the number of such directorships held by the executive (including the chairman of the board)
with the greatest number of directorships. Total assets are those reported by Compustat at yearend. Operating margin is the firm'soperating income standardized by total assets. Industry
directors are defined as individuals holding three or more directorships, who hold at least 50
percent of their directorships with the same two-digit SIC code. Board ownership is the aggregate equity ownership of the firm'sofficers and directors. Outside board ownership is the aggregate equity ownership of the firm'soutside directors. CEO ownership is the percentage equity
ownership held by the executive with the largest number of directorships. If executives are tied
in number of directorships, the ownership of the highest-ranking executive is included. Board
size is the total number of directors appointed to the firm'sboard. Percent outside directors
includes both independent and gray directors divided by the total number of board members.
The year subscript indicates the year for which the variable is estimated. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by * **, and ***, respectively.

Market-to-Book97 Market-to-Book97 Market-to-Book97
Intercept
Directorships per director95
Directorships per outside director95
CEO is a multiple director95
Directorships per director in
Forbes500 firms95
Directorships held by CEO in
Forbes500 firms95
Log of total assets94
Operating margin95

0.676**
0.068

Firm has an industry director
CEO is an industry director
Board ownership95
Outside directors ownership95
Ownership of CE095

0.228

-0.182

0.069
0.122
0.002**

0.001

0.093**
*
4.472*

0.147***
5.212***

0.070

0.267*

0.104
0.106*
6.230***
0.285

- 0.001
0.009*
0.000

0.015**
0.002

Log of board size95
Percent outside directors95

0.245**

0.130
0.004

0.405
0.004

Adjusted R2

0.145

0.154

0.157

Busyness Hypothesis predicts a negative market reaction. We find, however, positive (albeit statistically

insignificant)

returns for the overall sample. We also per-

form event studies for two subsamples of firms: (1) firms with multiple directors
adding an additional multiple director to its board, and (2) firms without
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TableVI

Event Period Returns of Multiple Directorship

Announcements

TableVI presents the results of an event study for days 0, +1, with day 0 being the date of the
announcement of the appointment of a multiple director. A director is considered to be a multiple director if he/she holds three or more directorships in sample firms. Announcements of multiple directorship appointments are identified from Dow Jones News Retrieval Service during
the years 1990to 1995.Foreach announcement, we use the directors listed in CompactDisclosure
prior to the announcement and after the announcement to identify whether directors are being
replaced, and if so the number of directorships held by the replaced director. If more than one
director is replaced, we assume that the newly appointed director replaces the director who
held the most directorships. Statistical significance at the five percent level is indicated by **.
Announcements of a
Announcements of an
Multiple Director
Increase in the
Appointment When
All
Number of Multiple There are No Multiple
Announcements
Directors on the Board
Directors
Number of firms

291

84

Abnormal return (days 0, +1)

0.2%

0.41%

(t-statistic)

(1.17)

(1.41)

41
2.12%

(2.27)**

multiple directors appointing a multiple director to the board for the first time.
While we find positive abnormal returns for both subsamples, only the latter is
statistically significant. These results suggest that market participants do not
believe that the appointment of directors holding multiple board seats harms
firm value.
C. CommitteeAssignments
As a more direct examination of the Busyness Hypothesis, Table VII compares
the participation on board committees by directors holding three or more appointments with that of other directors holding only one or two board seats. We
begin this analysis by randomly selecting 200 Forbes 500 firms and 100 non-Forbes
500 firms from our original sample and obtain data from their 1995 proxies concerning the composition of their audit, compensation, executive, nominating,
and other committees. We elect to construct our subsample in this fashion because of the greater incidence of multiple directorships among larger firms. The
Forbes 500 classification is a convenient manner to create subsamples reflecting
firm size. We then document the number of meetings that each committee holds
during a year and identify the chair of each committee. Based upon this data, we
compare the participation activity by multiple directors in our random sample
against directors with only one or two appointments as a further test of the quantity of monitoring provided by multiple directors.
The findings inTableVII indicate that multiple directors provide more committee service than do directors holding only one or two directorships. Multiple directors serve on more committees than do single or double directors and attend
more committee meetings in total. Multiple directors also serve on the
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TableVII

Comparative Committee Activity: Multiple versus Single/Double

Fromour sample of Compustatfirms with at least $100 million in total assets as of fiscal year-end 1994, we ran
100 non-Forbes500 firms and obtain committee membership data from their 1995 proxies. Means (median
activity are estimated for directors holding three or more appointments and those holding only one or two
are excluded. Statistical significance at the 10,5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by * **, and ***, respectiv

Base retainer
Compensationper board meeting
Compensationper committee meeting
Total cash compensation
Number of board meetings
Number of audit or compensation committee meetings
Number of audit or compensation committee memberships
Number of audit or compensation committees chaired
Number of committee meetings
Number of committee memberships
Number of committees chaired

Non-Forbes500 Firms (100 Random Firms)

F

Directors with
One or Two
Directorships

D
Multiple
Directors

13,895.42
(15,000)
917.03
(1,000)
713.96
(700)
24,282.66
(23,000)
7.02
(6)
2.85
(2)
0.94
(1)
0.139
(0)
4.22
(4)
1.37
(1)
0.21
(0)

16,201.32
(16,000)
988.81
(1,000)
795.39
(775)
26,971.71
(25,500)
7.20
(7)
3.62
(4)
1.18
(1)
0.184
(0)
4.93
(4)
1.68
(2)
0.26
(0)
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t-test
Wilcoxon z
2.76***
(2.50)**
1.07
(0.85)
1.16
(1.76)*
2.19**
(2.47)**
0.45
(0.57)
2.44**
(2.67)***
3.01*
(2.85)**
0.96
(1.09)
1.75*
(2.08)**
3.03***
(2.80)***
0.97
(1.21)
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important audit and compensation committees with greater frequency and
attend more of these committee meetings. Finally, we test if multiple directors
accept leadership roles on these committees by serving as committee chair. We
find that multiple directors chair more committees, including the audit and compensation committees, than do single or double directors.
These findings suggest that firms rely more heavily on multiple directors to
provide managerial oversight and monitoring through participation on corporate governance committees. Not surprisingly, multiple directors receive greater
compensation, both for committee service and overall. While the available data
do not allow us to study the relative intensity of effort, we find no evidence of
shirking by multiple directors. This finding is inconsistent with the predictions
of the Busyness Hypothesis and the concerns of the Council of Institutional Investors about inadequate monitoring by directors holding multiple board appointments.
D. Securities Litigation
The Busyness Hypothesis predicts that directors holding multiple directorships will have insufficient time to monitor the firm'smanagers, including the accuracy of their public statements, and, more critically, the firm's financial
disclosures. An active board is an important backstop for a firm's auditors in
their efforts to maintain the integrity of corporate financial disclosure. Thus,
the undersupervised managers of these firms are more likely to make misstatements about the firm and distort its reported results. Consequently, the Busyness
Hypothesis implies that the incidence of litigation for securities fraud will be
higher for those firms whose directors (particularly outside directors) hold multiple board appointments.
To test this implication of the Busyness Hypothesis we use the data set provided by the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse to identify the firms
in our sample that were sued in such actions during 1996,1997, and 1998.10This
produces a sample of 133 sued firms.1 We caution, however, that the Stanford list
includes all firms sued during those years. The allegations in those complaints
are untested and the firms sued have not necessarily committed the fraud alleged.We also note that the timing of the complaints is lagged; a securities fraud
lawsuit filed in 1996 would typically be based on events occurring in 1994 and
1995. We do not include firms that experienced other types of litigation because
that litigation can be identified only through the firm's 10-Ks. The SEC only requires the disclosure of litigation that is material and that determination is
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, en10http://www.securities.stanford.edu/.
acted December 22, 1995, requires plaintiffs filing securities fraud lawsuits to provide public
notice of the suit at the time of filing. Consequently, data on the number of suits filed after
1995 is considerably more reliable than for past periods.
1l Our sample construction excludes firms that are being sued for fraud in connection with
IPOs because those companies generally would not have been required to report to the SEC
prior to the public offering. IPO suits raise different legal issues, so their exclusion leaves a
more homogenous sample.
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highly fact specific and somewhat subjective. Moreover, the claims most similar
to securities fraud claims, corporate law derivative claims against officers and
directors, typically would not be disclosed since the corporation is not a defendant. In addition to data reliability, the set of securities fraud claims also
provides the advantage of providing a reasonably homogenous and well-studied
set of claims against the firm, which allows for use of appropriate control
variables.
We construct a control sample of non-sued firms to examine the role that multiple directorships might play in the likelihood of litigation against the firm. Each
sued firm is matched randomly with another firm from our sample within its industry based on two-digit SIC codes.
In Panel A of Table VIII, we compare various characteristics of firms facing
securities fraud lawsuits with the control sample. The differences between the
samples for our measures of multiple directorships are all statistically insignificant. Directors holding multiple appointments do not appear to be overrepresented in the set of firms facing lawsuits.
In Panel B of Table VIII, we examine the impact of multiple board appointments on the likelihood of securities fraud litigation against a firm using a multivariate logistic regression. The Busyness Hypothesis predicts that multiple
directorships will be positively related to the incidence of fraud because the acceptance of additional board appointments overcommits the director. Beasley
(1996), for instance, reports that the number of directorships held by outside directors is positively related to instances of financial statement fraud producing
SEC enforcement actions.
We include in the model other board characteristics that control for characteristics that might influence the quality of board monitoring. As previously noted,
larger boards might be unwieldy, making effective monitoring of corporate managers difficult. We therefore include board size as an independent variable. The
boards equity ownership is a measure of the incentive that directors have to
avoid the costs of litigation since as shareholders they suffer a pro rata reduction
of firm value due to any lawsuit.
We also include in the specification of our model a number of additional regressors that reflect critical elements of the firm's financial profile and can affect the
likelihood that a firm will be sued for securities fraud (Francis, Philbrick, and
Schipper (1994), Jones and Weingram (1996), and Johnson, Nelson, and Pritchard
(2000)). Total assets reflect the firm's ability to pay a judgment or settlement and
might correlate with the quality of internal controls. We include two measures of
the stability of the firm's stock in the period preceding the lawsuit. Share turnover is an element in the calculation of damages for a securities fraud class action
(and hence, the amount of potential attorneys' fees; Johnson et al.). In addition,
prior research shows that managers of firms that experience recent performance
declines might be more likely to commit fraud than those in successful firms (Arlen and Carney, (1992)).At a minimum, such firms are likely targets for plaintiffs'
attorneys. Accordingly, we include the minimum one-day market-adjusted return
for the year (250 trading days) prior to suit, as well as the cumulated return for
that year. The standard deviation of daily returns is included to control for the
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TableVIII

Characteristics

of Firms Facing Lawsuits

TableVIII presents results from our comparison of firms from our sample that were sued in securities fraud
with a matched sample of firms that were not sued. Directorship per outside director is the mean number
directors of the firm. This number is set to zero if the firm does not have any nonexecutives on the board o
numberof directors. Board ownership is the percent of the firm'stotal outstanding equity held by the firm'sdi
percent of total equity held by outside directors. The standard deviation of daily returns is calculated using
Share turnover is the volume of shares traded on the firm'sshares standardized by the number of shares ou
shares outstanding at the end of the month is cumulated over a year). Cumulated residuals are the cumulat
- 1 through Day - 250. Minimum stock return is the largest drop in stock price on any particular day dur
lawsuit. Statistical significance

at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.

Panel A: Means (Medians) of Selected Firm Characteristics
Firm Characteristic
Directorships per director
Directorships per outside director
Board ownership
Outside directors ownership
Board size
Percent outside directors
Total assets
Cumulated residuals in year - 1 (%)
Lowest one-dayreturn in year -1 (%)
Standard deviation of daily stock returns

Firms Facing Lawsuits

Control Sample

1.77
(1.56)
1.98
(1.74)
13.91
(6.33)
3.53
(0.38)
8.82
(8)
30.70
(27.92)
6842.78
(625.80)
- 26.59
(-47.74)
- 23.39
(-17.13)
0.029
(0.028)

1.75
(1.57)
1.86
(1.67)
18.82
(8.92)
6.43
(0.86)
9.11
(9)
30.77
(28.57)
4127.32
(628.91)
1.42
(-16.61)
- 10.61
( - 8.26)
0.026
(0.022)
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TableVIII -Continued

Panel A: Means (Medians) of Selected Firm Characteristics
Firm Characteristic

Firms Facing Lawsuits

Share turnover in year -1 ('000s)

3.064
(2.102)

Control Sample
1.946
(0.942)

Panel B: Logit Analysis of the Determinants of Fraud Litigation
Variable
Intercept
Directorships per director
Directorships per outside director
Board size
Board ownership
Outside directors ownership
Log of total assets
Cumulatedresiduals in year - 1
Lowest one-day return in year - 1
Standard deviation of daily stock returns
Share turnover in year - 1 ('000s)
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Model
3.68***
0.41
0.01
0.02*
0.24*
0.12
- 12.32***

- 11.72
0.08
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volatility of the firm's stock price. A large price drop is more likely to provoke
litigation if the firm's share price is otherwise stable.
Our results are consistent with our other tests of the Busyness Hypothesis.
Both the number of directorships per director and the directorships per outside
director have positive coefficients as predicted by the Busyness Hypothesis, but
neither is statistically significant. Other measures of multiple directorship (not
reported) provide similar results. These findings offer little support to the implication of the Busyness Hypothesis that inadequate monitoring by multiple directors can lead to greater likelihood that the firm will be sued for securities fraud.
E. Summary of Tests of the Busyness Hypothesis
In sum, our tests find no correlation between service on multiple boards by a
director or an executive and lower firm value. This result is inconsistent with the
predictions of the Busyness Hypothesis that such service will result in ineffective board oversight. Our event study results suggest that market participants
do not view the appointment of a multiple director as a negative event for the
firm. We find no evidence that multiple directors serve on fewer board committees or attend fewer committee meetings than their less-busy counterparts; in
fact, they sit on more committees and attend more meetings. Finally, we find no
statistically significant evidence that firms with multiple directors are more vulnerable to securities fraud litigation. We conclude that the evidence does not support the proposition that multiple board memberships harm firm value.
VI. Conclusion
This study focuses on one element affecting the quality of monitoring of corporate management by directors-the number of directorships held by directors.
We find that a set of firm and individual characteristics can be used to explain
the number of external directorships held by an individual, thus providing an
important insight into the nature of the supply curve for board directors. Directors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract
additional directorships. Multiple directors are usually older and corporate outsiders. They most commonly are executives, bankers, or consultants.
We also find that firm performance has a positive effect on the number of board
seats subsequently held by a director. This finding suggests that reputation matters in the market for directors. Specifically, offers of employment as a director
appear to be conditioned by the quality of previous board service as measured by
the firm'sfinancial performance. For executives, offers of board membership correlate with the performance of the firm that they manage. Thus, our results support Fama and Jensen's (1983) contention that there is a reputational effect in the
market for directors.
We fail to find the negative relation predicted by the Busyness Hypothesis between the number of board memberships held by a director and subsequent firm
performance. Our other tests of the Busyness Hypothesis are consistent with
these results. Market participants do not react negatively to the appointment of
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a multiple director. Further, we find no evidence that multiple directors shirk
their responsibilities to serve on board committees and no statistically significant evidence of a relation between multiple directorships and the likelihood
that the firm will be named in a securities fraud lawsuit.
These results undermine arguments by the Council of Institutional Investors
and other shareholder activists that excessive external commitments by a firm's
directors can harm firm performance. The evidence presented here does not support calls by corporate governance activists for limits on the number of directorships held by any one individual.
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